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Abstract
Do we know if a short selling ban or a Tobin Tax result in more stable asset prices? Or do they in fact
make things worse? Just like medicine regulatory measures in financial markets aim at improving
an already complex system. And just like medicine these interventions can cause side effects which
are even harder to assess when taking the interplay with other measures into account. In this paper
an agent based stock market model is built that tries to find answers to the questions above. In a
stepwise procedure regulatory measures are introduced and their implications on market liquidity
and stability examined. Particularly, the effects of (i) a ban of short selling (ii) a mandatory risk
limit, i.e. a Value-at-Risk limit, (iii) an introduction of a Tobin Tax, i.e. transaction tax on trading,
and (iv) any arbitrary combination of the measures are observed and discussed. The model is set
up to incorporate non-linear feedback effects of leverage and liquidity constraints leading to fire
sales and escape dynamics. In its unregulated version the model outcome is capable of reproducing
stylised facts of asset returns like fat tails and clustered volatility. Introducing regulatory measures
shows that only a mandatory risk limit is beneficial from every perspective, while a short selling
ban — though reducing volatility — increases tail risk. The contrary holds true for a Tobin Tax:
it reduces the occurrence of crashes but increases volatility. Furthermore, the interplay of measures
is not negligible: measures block each other and a well chosen combination can mitigate unforeseen
side effects. Concerning the Tobin Tax the findings indicate that an overdose can do severe harm.
Keywords: Tobin Tax, transaction tax, short selling ban, Value-at-Risk limits, risk management
herding, agent based models.
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1 Motivation
“It’s remarkable that while any new technical device or medical drug has exten-
sive testing for efficiency, reliability and safety before it ever hits the market, we still
implement new economic measures without any prior testing.”
— Dirk Helbing, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich in Buchanan (2009).
The financial crisis spurred the discussion about further regulations in asset markets. However,
the consequences of imposing a transaction tax, a short selling ban or mandatory risk limits are
unknown to a large extent. “Prior testing” is both: hardly feasible and absolutely necessary. Hardly
feasible, because the large sums of money handled, the interconnectedness of actions etc. do not
allow for lab experiments. Only within newly emerged agent based models this task seems doable.
At the same time, prior testing is absolutely necessary. Like the human body the financial market is
an enormously complex organism and like medicine regulatory measures aim at improving it. Side
effects or unforeseen interactions of measures require prior testing, as the quotation above demands.
This paper provides evidence if indeed imposing regulatory measures makes markets more stable.
To do so, an agent based model framework is set up, which shares basic ideas of Thurner et al.
(2009). Subsequently, this baseline model is modified by the introduction of regulatory measures.
Why Agent Based Models?
The dynamics of financial markets pose a challenge to research just as they pose a threat to
financial stability. Typically, asset returns are characterised by so called stylised facts including
fat tails and clustered volatility (see Cont 2001). Classic economic theory fails to predict such
behaviour. Recent literature, however, has shown that by the incorporation of leverage, fire sales,
escape dynamics and liquidity constraints stylised facts occur (Friedman and Abraham 2009). The
financial crisis confirmed the importance of taking such effects into account. However, modelling of
interaction effects in an analytical framework soon becomes untractable. Therefore, the dramatic
increase of computational power over the past decades gave rise to agent based models. Within such
models one is allowed to move away from the classical modelling approach featuring the represen-
tative agent but to model the action of each and every actor, thus integrating non-linear feedback
dynamics.1
1Numerous papers give witness to the popularity agent based models gained over the past two decades, see LeBaron
(2001) and LeBaron (2006) for extended literature discussions.
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While typical agent based models feature heterogeneous agents who dynamically optimize seem-
ingly irrational strategies2, Thurner et al. (2009) recently showed that even under the assumption of
relatively rational value-investors fat tails occur when feedback effects of leverage are incorporated.
The baseline model introduced in Section 2 draws on Thurner et al. (2009). It models leveraged
agents who trade a single asset according to a mispricing signal. In its unregulated version the
model reproduces fat tails and clustered volatility.
Regulatory Measures
The focus will then be shifted to the question of interest, the impact of regulatory measures. The
financial crisis has amplified voices demanding a stronger regulatory framework of asset markets.
Among the cloud of demands the following are picked for closer examination:
(i) a ban of short selling,
(ii) a mandatory risk limit and
(iii) a Tobin Tax, i.e. transaction tax on trading3.
In each of the three cases a high level of uncertainty concerning the consequences of an introduc-
tion prevent a fact-led discussion. This is probably best seen by reading the following two citations
of U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Christopher Cox. The first quote was said
at the time of introduction of the short selling ban in US-stock markets in September 2008 (New
York Times 2008) and the second only three months later in December 2008 (Reuters 2008):
“The emergency order temporarily banning short selling of financial stocks will restore
equilibrium to markets.”
“While the actual effects of this temporary action will not be fully understood for many
more months, if not years, knowing what we know now, I believe on balance the com-
mission would not do it again. . . . The costs appear to outweigh the benefits.”
In their empirical study Marsh and Niemer (2008) find “no strong evidence that (short selling
bans) have been effective in reducing share price volatility or limiting share price falls.” Further
2Compare for instance trend followers in models of Lux (1998) and De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) or the Minority
Game literature, e.g. Challet et al. (2001) and Satinover and Sornette (2007).
3While the Tobin Tax was originally suggested only for foreign exchange rate markets, the term is now regularly
applied to mean a tax on financial transactions in general. This paper will use the terms transaction tax and Tobin
Tax synonymously.
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studies based on observed data (e.g. Lobanova et al. 2010, Boehmer et al. 2009 and Beber and
Pagano 2009) find rather negative effects of short selling restrictions on market liquidity and in-
creasing effects on volatility.
Similarly, the adoption of a Tobin Tax, i.e. transaction tax on trading, has lead to controversy
within the field of academics as well as within politics. Originally proposed by Tobin (1978), the
tax now enjoys great popularity as a potential means to reduce market volatility and as source for
tax revenues. In fact, merely naming supporters and opposers of the tax would be way out of the
scope of this paper. However, a clear reflection of the popularity can be grasped by the length of
the respective article in Wikipedia (2010), which also provides a comprehensive list of the numerous
supporters and opposers in politics. In the academic world, studies come to mixed conclusions.
While a negative effect on trading volume is generally agreed upon, the impact on price volatility
is less clear cut and even contrary, leading Hanke et al. (2010) to infer that “in sum, the literature
on the effects of a Tobin tax on market efficiency arrives at opposite ends. . . . there is no gen-
eral agreement on the consequences of a Tobin tax on price volatility.” While some argue that a
transaction tax reduces the trading of rather uninformed actors, thus leading to more efficient and
less volatile markets, others argue that a transaction tax prevents flexible price adjustment to new
information and therefore rather leads to price jumps and higher volatility (see also the debate in
Hanke et al. 2010). Westerhoff (2003), Ehrenstein et al. (2005), Pellizzari and Westerhoff (2009)
and Mannaro et al. (2008) study the imposition of a transaction tax within the framework of agent
based models. While the latter conclude that volatility rises with the imposition of a Tobin Tax,
the other papers find that the effects depend on the liquidity of a market and on the magnitude of
the tax.
The third regulatory measure, titled mandatory risk limits, may seem less debated, but is in
fact already in place for many of the larger market participants like banks via the Basel regime. In
such a regime, agents are obliged to quantify their risk and relate this risk to their own funds, thus
keeping their theoretical default probability below a certain threshold. Insurers and hedge funds
are as well required to run risk managements techniques – a regulation that is currently intensified.
Irrespective of the regulatory framework, risk quantification and risk limiting has become a general
practice among the major market participants, i.e. funds and banks (see e.g. chapter 1.1 in McNeil
et al. 2005). While a sound risk management is without doubt for the benefit of the single institu-
tion, its consequences for systemic risks are ambiguous. To see this, imagine an agent close to its
risk limit when stocks decline. The decline not only shrinks her own funds but may also increases
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the risk quantified for the same position. This may in turn lead to fire sales, thus amplifying the
initial shock. Such phenomena combined with strategy herding could potentially lead to severe
downturn momentum.4
This paper not only discusses the implications of the three regulatory measures, but further
provides evidence on their potential interplay. While the interplay of drugs and their side effects is
a pervasive topic in medical research, it is much less debated in the context of financial markets.
Thus, this paper aims at giving answers to the interplay of the regulatory measures.
To conclude, the contribution of the paper is threefold. Firstly, while the effects of a short
selling ban and of a transaction tax have already been studied, there remains a level of uncertainty
that requires further research. Furthermore, the effects of risk limits — though beneficial on the
individual level — may have negative side effects, which seem to have been neglected in the scientific
discussion. Secondly, existing literature approaches the questions usually either from an empirical
view using observed data or a reduced form theoretical model, but not within the framework of
an agent based model5. Thirdly, to the author’s knowledge this paper is first in examining the
combination of these regulatory measures.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the baseline model
with no regulations in place. Subsequently, Section 3 presents adjustments due to the regulatory
measures. Finally, Section 4 discusses the results while Section 5 concludes and outlines potential
shortcomings of the approach, thus suggesting ways of further research.
4Strategy herding is in fact a major driver for market crashes in agent based Minority Games. See e.g. Satinover
and Sornette (2007).
5Note the exceptions concerning the Tobin Tax: Westerhoff (2003), Ehrenstein et al. (2005), Pellizzari and West-
erhoff (2009) and Mannaro et al. (2008).
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2 The Baseline Model
This section describes the baseline model representing the unrestricted market. The description
starts at the most general level and successively works downwards explaining the model in more
detail.
At the top level there is the market clearing equation defining that at each timestep t total
demand, as sum over the Na individual demands Di,t, must equal the total number of shares N
s,
therefore ensuring that supply meets demand and the market clears.
Na∑
i=1
Di,t(pt) = N
s (1)
As described below, demand of each single agent is a function of price pt among others. By
solving Equation (1) one obtains the price.6 At each timestep agents choose the fraction of their
total wealth Wi,t to be invested in cash Ci,t and in shares, therefore
Wi,t = Ci,t + ptDi,t(pt). (2)
Before turning to the demand equations, note that when Di,t < 0 agents take a short position
and when Di,t > 0 they are long. To fund their actions agents can leverage themselves up to
a maximum leverage of λmax.7 As long as leverage is not at its maximum, agents’ demand is a
linear function of the perceived mispricing signal. This mispricing signal is the difference between
the current price and the perceived fundamental value, thus mi,t := pt − pperci,t . This leads to the
demand functions:
Di,t =

(1− λmax)Wi,t/pt if mi,t < mcrit,shorti,t
λmaxWi,t/pt if mi,t > m
crit,long
i,t
βimi,tWi,t/pt otherwise,
(3)
where βi represents a parameter denoting the aggressiveness of the agent, that is how fast he
reacts to price signals and mcriti,t the mispricing signal which would lead to the use of the maximum
leverage. Thus, mcrit,shorti,t = (1− λmax)/βi if agent i is in a short position and mcrit,longi,t = λmax/βi
6This set–up is more sophisticated than the one used by usual agent based models, in which price is a (linear)
function of “excess demand”, which implies a linear response to market movements (e.g. Friedman and Abraham
2009). It comes, however, at the cost of more complex computational demands.
7According to modern standard, leverage is defined as the asset side (of the balance sheet) divided by own funds,
therefore λlongi,t := ptDi,t(pt)/Wi,t and λ
short
i,t := (Wi,t − ptDi,t(pt))/Wi,t.
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if she is long. While the first two lines of Equation (3) simply limit the demand to its maximum
leverage, the third specifies demand in the unbounded case as a linear function of the mispricing
signal and the aggressiveness of the agent, βi.
8 Price and wealth in Equation (3) ensures that at
a given mispricing signal two equally aggressive agents will invest the same fraction of their wealth.9
Until now, the perceived fundamental value of the share, pperci,t , was left unspecified. In this
model, agents’ perceptions follows a discrete Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process that guarantees the per-
ceived values to be wander around but mean revert to the fundamental value.
log pperci,t = ρ log p
perc
i,t−1 + (1− ρ) log V + i,t, (4)
where V = 1 denotes the true fundamental value,  ∼ N(0,Σ) and 0 < ρ < 1. In order to mirror
market wide misjudgement and herding  correlates across agents. Finally, in each round t before
each market participant i computes his demand according to Equation (3) and the price pt is derived
according Equation (1)10 the wealth Wi,t is updated according to
Wi,t = Wi,t−1 +Di,t−1 (pt − pt−1). (5)
In line with Thurner et al. (2009), agents default if their wealth, Wi,t, decreases below 10% of
their initial wealth and are reintroduced after 100 timesteps.
Figure 1 displays the implied characteristics of the returns of the unregulated model, calibrated
according to Table 3 (see appendix, page 21). While plot a and b display excess kurtosis present in
the implied time series of returns as well as a gain/loss asymmetry, plot c and d provide evidence on
the absence of autocorrelation among returns but non-zero autocorrelation among squared returns,
i.e. clustered volatility is present (see Cont 2001). The emergence of these characteristics are
endogenous considering the normal iid distribution of ~t in Equation (4).
8In fact, the underlying utility function would be (subscripts omitted): U(D,C) = Dβm C1−β . See also Thurner
et al. (2009).
9As in practice only a fraction of agents actually take short positions, for simulation purpose define τ as the fraction
of agents who avoid taking short positions even in the baseline model.
10Note that Equation (3) and Equation (1) have to be solved simultaneously as both depend on the other.
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Figure 1: Statistical Properties of Returns: (a) display of kernel density estimates of the returns
compared to the normal distribution with respective standard deviation, (b) Q-Q plot of returns
against normal and student t distributions with 7 df, (c) plot of a typical draw of returns, (d) au-
tocorrelation function for returns and squared returns with 95% confidence intervalls.
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3 Short selling ban, risk limits and transaction tax
Having specified the unregulated model, this section presents the amendments for each regulatory
measure in sequence.
Short selling ban
In the unregulated market, agents’ demand of shares can be positive or negative alike. In the
latter case, the agent goes short. To implement a short selling ban the demand Equation (3) has
to be adjusted to cap the demand at zero.
Di,t =

0 if mi,t ≤ 0
λmaxWi,t/pt if mi,t > m
crit,long
i,t
βimi,tWi,t/pt otherwise.
(6)
Note that in comparison to Equation (3) only the first line changed.
Value-at-Risk limits
As discussed in the introduction, Value-at-Risk is now a widely applied concept in risk manage-
ment. Hereby, one quantifies the risk of a given position according to a quantile of the estimated
loss distribution. While different methods are applied in practice, this paper sticks to the popular
and straight forward variant called variance-covariance approach. Hence, at each timestep market
participants calculate their individual Value-at-Risk for holding one unit of the asset:
VaRi,t = µi,t − α ∗ σi,t, (7)
where µi,t and σi,t are empirical estimates of mean and standard deviation of asset returns
which might deviate among agents and α = Φ−1(0.99) represents the 99%-quantile of the normal
distribution. Agents subjected to a Value-at-Risk limit are not only bound by the maximum leverage
constraint but by a maximum portfolio Value-at-Risk as well, which aims at reducing the default
probability of agents below a certain threshold. To adjust the demand equation of the baseline
model, define mcrit,vari,t := (βi VaRi,t)
−1 as the critical mispricing signal, at which the unbounded
demand would be higher than the maximum Value-at-Risk.11 Consequently, Equation (3) changes
to
11The deviation is simple, considering that the Value-at-Risk concept limits the portfolio VaR, Di,t · pt · VaRi,t,
to equal Wi,t at maximum.
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Di,t =

(1− λmax)Wi,t/pt if mi,t < mcrit,shorti,t
−Wi,t/(pt VaRi,t) if mi,t < −mcrit,vari,t
λmaxWi,t/pt if mi,t > m
crit,long
i,t
Wi,t/(pt VaRi,t) if mi,t > m
crit,var
i,t
βimi,tWi,t/pt otherwise,
(8)
while in case more than one restriction hits, the one that satisfies min(|Di,t|) is in effect. Com-
paring the baseline model of Equation (3) with Equation (8) above one finds that simply two new
lines have emerged holding the implied risk in check. Analogously, the simultaneous reign of a
short selling ban and a Value-at-Risk limit, would bind the demand to zero if mi,t ≤ 0, while the
remainder of Equation (8) would hold.
Transaction Tax
In its core, a transaction tax reduces the expected return of an investment by (twice)12 the tax
level applied. Agents will therefore require a higher expected payoff for the same level of investment,
i.e. their demand in the asset. Consequently, agents will keep their current demand unchanged,
if they are subjected to only a minor mispricing signal, or in other words will only change their
demand if the mispricing signal is strong enough, so that expected payoffs of the trade are positive.
Hence, under the regime of a transaction tax, agents compute their demand according to
Di,t =

Di,t−1 if |D∗i,t −Di,t−1| < Γ
(1− λmax)Wi,t/pt if mi,t < mcrit,shorti,t
λmaxWi,t/pt if mi,t > m
crit,long
i,t
βimi,tWi,t/pt otherwise,
(9)
where Γ is a threshold for the mispricing signal, and D∗i,t is the demand that would result without
incorporation of the Tobin Tax, i.e. without the first line of Equation (9). Note that only this first
line is new and in case more than one restriction hits, the one that satisfies min(|Di,t|) is in effect.
This ensures that changes in demand due to shifts in the mispricing signal, mi,t, require a defined
magnitude. In the simulation the threshold is chosen in order to keep (empirically determined)
expected returns of trading positive.
Combination of Regulatory Measures
For any arbitrary combination of the three regulatory measures one has to merge the formulas
12The tax is applied at buying and selling the asset.
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from above. As in each case restrictions are added to the original demand, merging them is straight
forward. For instance, under a short selling ban and a Value-at-Risk limit demand is limited to
zero or positive values, while at the upper bound the leverage and Value-at-Risk limit bind demand
against becoming excessive. As the final set of equation for each combination of regulatory measures
is somewhat lengthy their display is omitted here.
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4 Results
This section will now turn to the simulated impacts of the regulatory measures on (i) market
liquidity, (ii) market volatility, (iii) market stability, i.e. the risk of tail events, and (iv) probability
of default of an agent. A reasonable estimate for market liquidity seems to be
liquidity :=
1
(N t − 1)Na
Nt∑
t=2
Na∑
i=1
|Di,t −Di,t−1| , (10)
i.e. the average amount of shares traded by an agent per timestep. N t denotes the number of
timesteps in one simulation run. To measure market volatility the standard deviation of returns
will be evaluated and for market stability its respective (excess) kurtosis, as a measure for extreme
shifts in the price.13 Finally, the number of defaults of each run is evaluated.
As a first result, figure 2 visualises the resulting distribution of the relevant metrics. Market
liquidity shows strong dependence on both short selling restrictions and the Tobin Tax. Not only
does market liquidity drop, also its volatility across runs is drastically reduced. The volatility of
returns seems to be negatively affected by a short selling ban, while also a mandatory VaR limit
contributes. Concerning the kurtosis, there is less clear cut evidence. Its distributions is strongly
skewed to the right – in fact, a few points lie far in the extreme tail, even overreaching 50. The
number of defaults is obviously affected by a short selling ban, which reduces their numbers strongly.
To assess the effects of regulatory measures more closely liquidity, standard deviation, kurtosis
and number of defaults are regressed on the exogenous dummy variables short selling ban, Value-
at-Risk limit, Tobin Tax and respective interaction terms as indicating the regulatory measure to
be in effect or not. As indicated by figure 2 – especially the liquidity plot – , heteroskedasticity is
an issue. Hence, the regression was conducted using feasible GLS14. Table 1 displays the regression
results with stars indicating statistical significance. With an adjusted R squared of 0.89 the liquid-
ity model manages to explain a relatively high fraction of the endogenous variance. Interestingly,
all regulatory measures reduce market liquidity. The largest reduction in market liquidity stems
13As large upswings do not pose a thread to financial stability in themselves, the kurtosis is evaluated from the
distribution in which negative returns are flipped at zero and positive ones are ignored. It turned out that none of
the results depend on the flipping and the new measure is correlated by more than 0.89 with the standard kurtosis.
14Alternatively, one can look at the quantiles of the resulting distributions. Find the respective quantile regression
results in the appendix, Table 4, page 22. In short, the picture modelling the median is very similar both in terms
of magnitude and significance of the parameters compared to the feasible GLS regression results displayed in this
section.
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Figure 2: Distributions of market characteristics under different regulatory regimes.
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from an introduction of a short selling ban, while the introduction of a Tobin Tax ranks second.
According to the GLS coefficients, a transaction tax of 0.3%15 reduces the average amount of traded
assets of a single agent by 0.13 per timestep. However, also surprising is the fact that the combined
introduction of a transaction tax and a VaR limit significantly offsets part of the individual liquidity
reducing effects.
exogenous liquidity volatility (sd) kurtosis defaults
Intercept 0.824 *** 2.677 *** 2.16 *** 310.935 ***
VaR -0.006 *** -0.01 *** -0.186 *** -9.745 ***
ssban -0.133 *** -0.046 *** 0.344 *** -84.836 ***
TT -0.112 *** 0.022 *** -0.4 *** -3.225 ***
(VaR*ssban) 0.002 . 0 -0.08 3.883 ***
(VaR*TT) -0.001 . -0.003 . -0.008 -1.03
(ssban*TT) 0.021 *** 0.005 ** -0.165 ** 5.635 ***
(VaR*TT*ssban) 0 0.001 0.06 0.161
adj.R2 0.887 0.158 0.034 0.738
Significance Codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1
Table 1: Results of feasible GLS regression.
As anticipated from figure 2, both, a short selling ban and a VaR limit, temper market move-
ments by reducing market volatility. More surprising is probably the fact that a Tobin Tax increases
market volatility by a statistically significant amount. In line with volatility, obligatory VaR limits
remedies huge swings in markets as seen in the column of kurtosis. Likewise, tail events occur
more seldom when a transaction tax is introduced. Both effects are statistically and economically
significant. By contrast, a short selling ban positively influences the probability of market crashes,
via a prior build up of market bubbles. The fact that a short selling ban reduces volatility while
increasing the likelihood of tail events emerges due to the absence of critical investors. Bubbles are
nurtured in a calm environment of low volatility, which lead to crashes when resolved. Figure 3
displays a typical asset price movement under three regimes that visualizes this. At first, there
is hardly any difference in the price level and volatility is low. At a certain point, prices start to
increase steeply. This is also the point where they start to move away across regimes. While in
the VaR regime and even in the unrestricted model price rises are more modest, with short selling
prohibited the price rises extraordinarily quickly. The following fall comes certain and costs the
15See Table 3 on page 21 in the appendix for the calibration used. Within the regression model all exogenous
variables are dummy variables.
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Figure 3: Price dynamics display higher kurtosis under a short selling ban.
default of four agents. Consequent wealth effects cause a lower average price level in the following
periods compared to the other regimes. However, regarding the respective GLS coefficients of the
interaction terms in Table 1, this dynamic is mitigated, when a short selling ban is combined with
VaR limits or a Tobin Tax.
The number of defaults is negatively associated with all of the regulatory measures. By far the
strongest reductions comes from a short selling ban. This is easily explainable: with short selling
present in the market, the level of risk is much higher, as agents in a short position would otherwise
have no exposure. Additionally, they require a counterpart for their position. Hence, the level of
risk across the system is higher, therefore leading to substantially more defaults.
While the result that a Tobin Tax increases volatility and reduces tail risk is interesting in itself,
one might be interested in how this conclusion changes when the tax level varies (i.e. deviates from
its standard value of 0.003). Indeed, e.g. Westerhoff (2003) finds a dependence of the results on
the level of the tax. Consequently, simulations with a Tobin Tax of 0.1%, up to a level of 5% were
15
run. Table 2 and Figure 4 display the results. While there is only a modest increase in volatility
noticeable up to a level of 1%, volatility increases quite drastically above 1%. At 5% average market
volatility outreaches 10%, a substaintail increase from its inital value. As already noted above, a
Tobin Tax has a mitigating effect on tail risk in the model applied. This can also be seen in Table 2,
where the kurtosis of returns is reduced by a Tobin Tax. However, there is — indeed — a certain
threshold, at which the medicine is overdosed. At a level of 2% the average kurtosis jumps and
market stability is figuartively dead at any higher level of the tax.16
Level of
Tobin Tax 0 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05
Volatility (sd)
mean 0.0265 0.0265 0.0268 0.0273 0.0288 0.0385 0.0614 0.1179
median 0.0265 0.0265 0.0267 0.0272 0.0287 0.0310 0.0361 0.0458
75%-quantile 0.0269 0.0269 0.0271 0.0276 0.0291 0.0315 0.0848 0.1755
Kurtosis
mean 2.7001 2.0776 2.1974 2.7656 2.3772 27.5035 67.2611 28.9119
median 1.8470 1.7456 1.3924 1.0233 0.9122 1.9334 6.2367 6.3635
75%-quantile 2.8359 2.7072 2.2074 1.6381 1.1505 2.2974 >100 >100
Table 2: Statistics of returns under different levels of Tobin Tax.
What can we now learn from the results? First, the results show that in the chosen setting a
mandatory risk limit is the only measure that is beneficial from all perspectives17. A ban on short
selling reduces market volatility, but comes with an increase in tail risk. On the other hand, a
Tobin Tax reduces the occurrence of bubbles while at the same time makes markets more volatile.
However, when increased over a certain thresholds results turn and a Tobin Tax clearly contributes
to market instability from all perspectives.
Second, the interplay of measures does play a role in judging on the regulatory medicine to
be prescribed. When a mandatory risk limit or a Tobin Tax is present, a ban of short selling has
significantly lower impact on tail risk than without. The column concerning the number of defaults
in Table 1 also indicates, that regulatory measures can block each other to some extent. While the
interplay of these measures should not be left unconsidered when deciding on their implementation,
there is no evidence that they turn individual effects in a different direction.
16 For a display of results across different regulatory regimes see Table 5 in the appendix, page 23.
17 Liquidity is omitted here.
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Figure 4: Market characteristics under different levels of Tobin Tax.
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However, when interpreting the results one should bare in mind that the model setup is an
abstraction and that while it provides a range of features, certain shortcomings should be addressed
in future research: The high dimensionality of input parameters brings about the question, if the
results are stable to a different calibration. Tests in this direction are already on the way. Similarly,
one could ask if there would be a change in results when the risk limits are only applied by the
largest agents or if their conception is more homogeneous across agents. Likewise, the question
arises what if not the whole market would be subjected to a Tobin Tax but tax havens are present.
Furthermore, with a short selling ban in place market participants might anticipate the absence of
short sellers and incorporate it in their demand decisions, thus mitigating the risk of bubbles.
18
5 Conclusions
This paper introduces an artificial market where agents trade a single asset. The conception of rel-
atively rational agents allows for a straight forward implementation of regulatory measures. These
are a short selling ban, a Tobin Tax, a mandatory Value-at-Risk limit and any arbitrary combination
of these. In its unregulated version, the model is capable of reproducing stylised facts of financial
markets, most notably fat tails and clustered volatility.
Introducing regulatory measures constitutes an intervention into a complex system, whose con-
sequences, side effects and joint interplay are ex ante unclear. The results described in Section 4
constitute a reduction of market liquidity under each of the regulatory regimes. A finding less sur-
prising than the one concerning market stability: the results indicate that only a mandatory risk
limit is beneficial from every perspective, while a short selling ban — though reducing volatility —
increases tail risk. The contrary holds true for a Tobin Tax: it reduces the occurrence of crashes
but increases volatility — an outcome that shows the importance of prior testing. However, when
increased over a certain thresholds results turn and a Tobin Tax clearly contributes to market in-
stability from all perspectives. Furthermore, the interplay of measures is not negligible. Regression
analyses show that measures can block each other and a well chosen combination can mitigate un-
foreseen side effects.
However, further research is indeed needed to test the robustness of the results with regard to
the calibration. The high dimensionality of input parameters makes this a challenging task, but a
worthy considering the necessity for prior testing, as Dirk Helbing would argue.
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A Appendix
Table 3 presents the values used for simulation. The model was calibrated to fit roughly weekly data
of stock markets. Where possible values from Thurner et al. (2009) were used. Each run composes
4000 timesteps. One draw of ~t was used for every regulatory regime in sequence.
Table 4 depicts the analogon to Table 1, but instead of feasible GLS quantile regression is used
to model the medians of the market characteristics. Standard errors of coefficients were obtained us-
ing bootstrapping methods. The values are strikingly close to the ones of the feasible GLS regression.
Table 5 shows the results of a varying degree of Tobin Tax and varying regulatory regimes in
place (i.e. a short stelling ban and/or a mandatory risk limit). For the aggregated view (across all
regimes) see Table 2 in Section 4, page 16.
The simulation was set up in R programming language.
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exogenous liquidity volatility (sd) kurtosis defaults
Intercept 0.821 *** 2.676 *** 1.821 *** 308 ***
VaR -0.006 *** -0.01 *** -0.199 *** -9 ***
ssban -0.131 *** -0.046 *** 0.283 *** -83 ***
TT -0.112 *** 0.021 *** -0.407 *** -3 ***
(VaR*ssban) 0.003 ** 0 -0.051 3 **
(VaR*TT) -0.001 -0.004 * 0.024 -1
(ssban*TT) 0.021 *** 0.006 * -0.125 * 6 ***
(VaR*TT*ssban) 0 0.002 0.024 0
Significance Codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1
Table 4: Results of quantile regression for the median.
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Level of
Tobin Tax 0 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05
Volatility (sd)
ssban=off & VaR=off
mean 0.0268 0.0268 0.0270 0.0276 0.0291 0.0311 0.0335 0.0424
median 0.0268 0.0268 0.0270 0.0275 0.0291 0.0311 0.0335 0.0424
75%-quantile 0.0271 0.0271 0.0273 0.0279 0.0294 0.0314 0.0340 0.0431
ssban=on & VaR=off
mean 0.0263 0.0263 0.0266 0.0272 0.0288 0.0308 0.0333 0.0424
median 0.0263 0.0263 0.0266 0.0272 0.0288 0.0308 0.0333 0.0424
75%-quantile 0.0267 0.0266 0.0269 0.0275 0.0291 0.0312 0.0338 0.0431
ssban=off & VaR=on
mean 0.0267 0.0267 0.0269 0.0273 0.0288 0.0463 0.0890 0.1915
median 0.0267 0.0266 0.0268 0.0273 0.0286 0.0312 0.0836 0.1756
75%-quantile 0.0270 0.0270 0.0272 0.0277 0.0289 0.0683 0.1025 0.2133
ssban=on & VaR=on
mean 0.0263 0.0262 0.0265 0.0270 0.0285 0.0462 0.0898 0.1967
median 0.0262 0.0262 0.0264 0.0270 0.0284 0.0309 0.0859 0.1757
75%-quantile 0.0265 0.0265 0.0268 0.0273 0.0286 0.0681 0.1015 0.2182
Kurtosis
ssban=off & VaR=off
mean 2.9987 2.0928 2.3827 4.7605 2.4309 1.9394 3.2479 4.9251
median 1.8204 1.7082 1.4136 1.0377 0.9532 1.8795 3.2058 4.8683
75%-quantile 2.7932 2.6700 2.2109 1.6856 1.2171 2.1333 3.5810 5.4066
ssban=on & VaR=off
mean 2.8150 2.2957 2.2823 3.2105 2.7176 1.9308 3.3086 4.9295
median 2.1041 1.9867 1.5727 1.1959 0.9412 1.8772 3.2650 4.8795
75%-quantile 3.1662 3.0241 2.4672 1.8577 1.1714 2.1391 3.6347 5.3922
ssban=off & VaR=on
mean 2.4366 1.8568 2.0085 1.1941 2.2026 >100 >100 >100
median 1.6215 1.5430 1.2379 0.8922 0.8696 1.9902 >100 >100
75%-quantile 2.5234 2.4760 1.9687 1.4305 1.0994 >100 >100 >100
ssban=on & VaR=on
mean 2.5490 2.0652 2.1160 1.8971 2.1578 >100 >100 >100
median 1.8530 1.7365 1.3694 0.9849 0.8784 1.9899 >100 >100
75%-quantile 2.8225 2.6501 2.1724 1.4909 1.1164 >100 >100 >100
Table 5: Statistics of returns under different levels of Tobin Tax.
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